3 strong historical ties with most of these African countries, currently as a partner in the Commonwealth of Nations. As it seems unlikely that the British pound is replaced by the euro in the next few years, it makes sense to evaluate its suitability as a reference currency, in the context of this analysis. Finally, the Japanese yen, though a more unlikely choice, is considered for the fact that Japan is a major trade partner for many COMESA members, in some cases the most important of the four.
Given the relatively low weight of intra African trade, even within regional economic communities, and thus the improbable choice of internal currency pegs, our study may also be useful for other planned African monetary unions. Accordingly, in addition to current COMESA members, the empirical analysis includes other relevant African economies involved in integration projects aiming at full monetary integration, such as
Morocco and Tunisia (members of the Arab Maghreb Union), Ghana and Nigeria (members of the West African Monetary Zone and of the Economic Community of
West African States) and South Africa and Tanzania (members of the Southern Africa Development Community). Other countries, belonging to the two CFA franc zones, whose currencies were pegged to the French franc and, since 1999, to the euro, are obviously not considered.
As noted by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997, p. 761) , although 'many economists did not like it very much', the OCA theory remained 'the workhorse for analyses of European monetary unification'. The theory has also rooted many assessments of monetary integration in Africa and is adopted as the basis for our empirical study, which uses the OCA index developed by the two authors. As discussed in more detail ahead, this approach does not cover all relevant considerations that decision makers should take into account. The index comprises various OCA characteristics but fails to 4 explicitly take into account the dynamics underlying economic and monetary integration processes, also disregarding policy discipline and institutional credibility gains from monetary integration.
However, both theoretical and empirical developments, of which the first ten years of full monetary union in Europe are a good example, suggest that the most challenging features of monetary integration draw from individual countries' incapacity to smooth their economies in the aftermath of asymmetric shocks (or of common shocks with specific impacts across the integrated area). Such difficulties, resulting from strict fiscal constraints and from the absence of alternative adjustment mechanisms capable of providing at least some short term relief following a crisis, highlight the utility of real convergence before embarking on monetary integration. In fact, when participating countries exhibit relatively heterogeneous productive structures, the probability of specific disturbances does not decline with the progress of integration, increasing the costs of monetary unification. The OCA index encompasses some of the effects of productive specialization, namely the asymmetry of shocks and the dissimilarity of the commodity composition of exports, and is thus one practical tool to evaluate monetary integration projects.
-The optimum currency area theory, monetary integration in Africa and the choice of an international monetary anchor
The COMESA convergence criteria require that all member countries have market determined foreign exchange rates by 2015. 4 Currently, though some progress has been 5 achieved, different regimes, presented in Table 1 , and some government intervention still prevail amongst COMESA members. Given the specified objective of full economic and monetary union, exchange rate variability within COMESA will disappear and, consequently, domestic autonomy over foreign exchange and monetary policies will then be lost. According to the optimum currency area theory, 5 such loss is less costly for open economies sharing high levels of bilateral trade, for the lost policy instruments would be of little use in such contexts.
Costs also diminish when labour and capital are mobile and common fiscal stabilisers are available to substitute for the abandoned policy tools.
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In addition, to prevent monetary integration from compromising economic development and social welfare, significant levels of real convergence should be attained, to reduce the number of asymmetric disturbances requiring differentiated adjustment responses.
In the case of African economies, however, the relatively high degree of trade specialization increases the likelihood of specific shocks and the potential utility of domestic shock absorbers. More specific studies were developed by, inter alia, Khamfula and Teseayohannes (2004) , who analysed OCA conditions within the Southern African Development Community, Buigut and Valev (2006) , who studied demand and supply shocks hitting However, following Krugman (1991 Krugman ( , 1993 , economic and monetary integration will only improve the OCA characteristics of the involved countries if a reduction in transaction costs, resulting from eliminating foreign exchange variability, leads to an increase in the amount of intra-industry trade in the integrated area. If no significant trade growth occurs, or if (due to productive specialization) trade between member countries is mainly inter-industrial, the OCA qualities of the area would not be enhanced and participating countries would find monetary union more costly than beneficial.
The utility of the OCA index for our analysis resides in its informative power on the nature of dynamic developments that are most likely to unravel in a specific integration context (specifically, whether more specialization or more convergence is expected). As the index includes variables related to the asymmetry of shocks and to the type of trade between countries, it allows for a differentiation between more and less prepared countries for monetary integration. 
-The optimum currency area determinants of exchange rate variability
Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) , the estimating equation assumes the variability of bilateral exchange rates to be dependent upon a series of explanatory variables that encapsulate traditional OCA conditions: the asymmetry of business cycles between the two countries, the dissimilarity of the composition of exports, the bilateral openness ratio and the average economic dimension:
Since the main purpose of the paper is to assess the relative degree of compliance with the OCA conditions of the African countries vis-a-vis the main potential monetary anchors, the estimation only considers the exchange rate behaviour between each of the 56 countries in the sample, including 21 African nations, and the currently four main international currencies.
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The dependent variable sder ij is the standard deviation, over an eleven-year period, of the yearly log-variations of the bilateral nominal exchange rate between countries i and j:
where er ij is the nominal exchange rate between country i and country j in a given year.
Here, j is either the US dollar, the euro, the yen or the British pound, the currencies of the four reference countries. Exchange rate variability in this period is higher when the yen is the partner currency, and very similar on average when considering the other three monetary anchors (see Table 2 ). Although not shown in the table, it is also slightly higher for the African countries than for the other nations in the sample.
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The asymmetry of business cycles, sdy ij , is measured as the standard deviation of the difference in the real output growth rates between countries i and j: To quantify the degree of dissimilarity in export patterns, dissim ij is computed as the sum of the absolute differences in the relative share of each of eleven categories of merchandise trade in each pair of countries, 10 10 A more detailed classification of exports could potentially reflect more accurately the differences in export patterns, but it is difficult to find correct, complete and long datasets when studying African countries. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) considered only three categories of exports: manufactured goods, food and minerals. We chose the more detailed and informative taxonomy provided by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC rev. 1), consisting of the following 10 broad categories
where k is k-th product category and X k is the product share in total merchandise trade.
The computation of this variable has shown that, for this sample of countries and time period, the export structure is more dissimilar when Japan is the reference country, and also when considering the African countries. This probably reflects the high degree of specialization in the exports of agricultural and mineral primary products in some of these economies, as noted by Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) .
The variable btrade ij is the mean of the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic GDP in both countries:
where X ij is the bilateral export flows from country i to country j. This bilateral openness variable registers, as expected for this sample, a lower value for the African states and when Japan and the UK are the reference countries. The African countries are on average considerably more open to the Eurozone than to any other reference partner.
To account for the relative economic dimension of both economies, size ij is the mean of the two countries' log of GDP, measured in US dollars: Given the set of 56 countries in the sample and 4 reference partners, equation (1) was estimated for the 1999-2009 period averages with a total of 224 observations. The beginning of the sample was chosen to coincide with the emergence of the euro, but also because of difficulties in finding previous homogeneous data on trade composition for some of the African countries.
-OLS estimation
As often expected in this type of model, problems of heteroskedasticity emerged in the residuals of the simple OLS estimation, identified with the Breusch-Pagan test, potentially causing biased standard errors and consequently biased statistical inference.
Therefore, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors have been computed using the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance to allow the fitting of the model. These robust standard errors allow more accurate hypothesis tests and confidence intervals.
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The regression specification error test (RESET) also uncovered problems of model specification, solved when using logs in the btrade and size variables and introducing a dummy variable do distinguish when Japan was the partner country (dJapan). During this period, as noted above, these countries' bilateral exchange rates with Japan exhibited on average a significantly higher variability than with the other three partners.
The cross-country estimation produced the following results: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, the overall R-squared for the goodness of fit is 0.19 for 224 observations. The F-statistic (7.11) for the joint significance of the independent variables, here a Wald test using the robustly estimated variance matrix, rejects the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are zero.
The Ramsey regression specification error test, after the few changes in the model specification reported above, did not reject the null hypothesis of no omitted variables, at the 5% significance level, with a test statistic of 2.32.
All coefficients display the expected signs and, with the exception of dissim, all are statistically significant at least at the usual 95% confidence level. The probable explanation for the lack of significance of the variable measuring the dissimilarity in the composition of exports is that, being a secondary proxy for the asymmetry of shocks, its significance may be overpowered by the variable measuring output disturbances, a possibility also observed by Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (2000) . In fact, dissim 16 becomes statistically significant when removing sdy from the equation, suggesting a collinearity problem, although the overall explanatory power of the model considerably decreases.
The results thus seem to confirm the previous findings in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and Horváth (2007) , suggesting that the standard OCA factors help explain the dynamics of bilateral exchange rate variability also in a more recent time period and with a completely different set of countries, including a large sample of African nations.
-IV-GMM estimation
The OLS estimation results above may be misleading if any of the regressors are endogenously determined by the dependent variable. In particular, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) , for industrial countries, and Devereux and Lane (2003) , for industrial and developing countries, note that the volume of bilateral trade (lnbtrade) and the asymmetry of business cycles (sdy) may be potentially influenced by the variability of the bilateral exchange rate. Therefore, for a more consistent estimate of the model, we instrumented those two variables using the log-distance between both countries (lndistance), and three dummy variables indicating whether both countries share a common border (border) or a common language (language) and if they had a colonial relationship in the past (colonizer). These instruments are drawn from the traditional gravity model literature on bilateral trade flows, and have also been chosen by Devereux and Lane (2003) and, except for the variable colonizer since their studies only cover industrial nations, by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) and Horváth (2005) .
Before presenting and discussing the results of the estimation using instrumental variables, it is convenient to check if this choice of instruments satisfies both necessary conditions of validity and relevance for the consistency of the instrumental-variables GMM estimator. The Hansen's J test statistic (0.0476, with a p-value of 0.9765) does not provide evidence against the validity of the instruments or the correct specification of the structural equation, giving confidence that the instrument set is appropriate. To assess the relevance of the instruments, Shea's partial R-squared of 0.031 for the variable sdy and 0.139 for the variable lntrade suggests, as expected, that these instruments are more relevant to explain trade flows than the asymmetry of economic shocks.
11 It is however difficult to draw definite conclusions from these values of the partial R-squared, for a lack of absolute standard references, as these statistics depend on the specifics of the data employed and of the model being estimated. 
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GMM estimates, with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. Equation (1) 
(P-values in parentheses). The C-statistic stands for the Sargan test of endogenous regressors (P-values in parentheses)
. Column (3) replicates the OLS estimates obtained before. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
When both sdy and lnbtrade are treated as endogenous variables, only the latter retains statistical significance in the regression. When only lnbtrade is considered endogenous, the results are very similar to the ones obtained before using simple OLS: apart from dissim, all other OCA variables display the expected signs and statistical significance.
However, both Sargan's C tests of endogeneity (orthogonality conditions), reported in the bottom line of the table, fail to reject the null hypothesis that these regressors are in fact exogenous. This implies that although the instrumental variables estimator is consistent, since the test statistics discussed above suggest that the instruments employed are both valid and relevant, it is also inefficient. The OLS estimator is more efficient and it will hence be employed in the OCA indices analysis below. The equation estimated above can be employed, as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) , to compute an index comparing each individual country's OCA characteristics, relatively to a reference country. In the particular case of the African countries, this may help discern which groups of countries share identical OCA features, rendering them more suitable to take part in a monetary union, and may also help clarify which international currency should, if they choose to, be preferred as an anchor currency.
The index values in Table 4 are computed for the relationship between the individual African countries and each of the four reference currencies. The index corresponds to the fitted value for the exchange rate variability using the point estimates of the parameters obtained above in the OLS regression. The index is thus a weighted sum of each country's various OCA conditions considered here, taking the equation above as deterministic. The smaller the value of the index, the more would a country benefit from pegging its currency to the reference country.
The least integrated countries, with higher indices whatever the reference partner, are almost invariably Eritrea, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Malawi (only Nigeria is not in COMESA). On the other side of the spectrum, the more integrated countries rank differently for different reference partners. The top four in the rankings are precisely the same and in the same order when considering the US or the UK (Swaziland, Mauritius, Comoros and Ghana -the first three are COMESA economies), but differ slightly when the reference partner is the Eurozone, and substantially against Japan. The margins of error around the predicted values of the model are displayed in parentheses. Overall, these African countries appear to be generally more integrated with the 
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OCA indices when considering the US as the partner country rather than the Eurozone.
Coincidentally, these are the only two African countries in the sample where the US is a more relevant trade partner than the Eurozone during the analysed period. Eritrea and Ethiopia, a single country until 1993, display the higher OCA index values with reference to the US. Swaziland, the small landlocked country in Southern Africa, and
Comoros and Mauritius, two archipelago island nations in the Indian Ocean, located off the Eastern coast of Africa, appear to be the most integrated with the US. Of these, only
Mauritius currently pegs its currency to the dollar.
Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (2000), using a slightly different methodology for the pre-euro period, also concluded that the only four African countries present in their sample should prefer to peg their currencies to the euro over the US dollar. 
-Conclusions
The OCA index proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) was utilised to evaluate the quality of four potential anchors -the euro, the US dollar, the British pound and the yean -for COMESA countries, and a set of other selected African economies, if they decide to peg domestic currencies to an international money in their way to monetary union. The pegging strategy has been defended as a way of locking up success attained in the process of integration while, simultaneously, providing both the experience needed to manage domestic economies in a more restricted policy environment and the time to adapt before abandoning autonomy over instruments that may be useful in the adjustment to asymmetric shocks.
Although disregarding explicit dynamic and institutional credibility effects, the index encapsulates various OCA requirements and may be interpreted as an indicator for individual countries' readiness for monetary integration. The estimates obtained in this study suggest that not all COMESA members are equally prepared, and thus should not advance at the same speed, to monetary union. Countries displaying lower OCA indices should peg first, while the others should follow only after having attained higher levels of economic integration. This is even more relevant in the African context, where the relatively high level of productive specialization suggests that lower transaction costs will mainly promote inter-industrial trade (associated to more asymmetric shocks) within integrated areas. Furthermore, some of the assessed member countries seem to be more prepared to embark on alternative monetary arrangements than to commit to full integration in the context of this community.
Despite the fact that currently eight COMESA countries have their currencies pegged to the dollar, and only two to the euro, these economies are generally more integrated with the Eurozone and the UK than with the US or Japan. Focusing only on the possibility of pegging against the euro or the pound, three groups of countries emerge within COMESA, in terms of their readiness to fix domestic currencies: Swaziland, Mauritius and Comoros, displaying the lowest OCA index values, form the most integrated group;
Madagascar, Ethiopia, Malawi and Eritrea are the less integrated; Burundi, Uganda, Zambia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Rwanda, Egypt and Sudan comprise the intermediate set.
Some of these countries, for example Swaziland, Mauritius, Zambia or Rwanda, would probably marginally benefit from pegging their currencies against the British pound, while the remaining eleven COMESA members in our sample should peg to the euro.
All these countries have agreed to achieve full monetary integration in the context of COMESA. Therefore, the groupings identified in this analysis should not be taken as evidence that a number of countries should embark on closer economic associations amongst themselves, but rather that some appear to be more prepared for an intermediate phase of fixing domestic moneys against a foreign peg, before full monetary union. The groupings also indicate that a single peg appears not to be equally adequate for the whole set of COMESA countries. However, the hypothesis of pegging to a currency basket instead of a single currency has not been formally considered in this paper. It is nevertheless an option which may be particularly attractive for those countries where no clear superiority of an international monetary anchor over another has emerged in the analysis. Potential benefits arising from joint pegs to the same external anchor, namely trade network externalities, should also be considered in such cases.
Overall, the information provided by the OCA indices suggests that the COMESA group is not yet well suited for monetary integration. Some of its members are already 28 quite integrated, but the whole set is heterogeneous, with various countries closer to third countries (with which, in some cases, they share membership in other communities) than to their COMESA counterparts. In spite of the expected institutional and political credibility gains from monetary integration, the experience of the Eurozone suggests that monetary integration involving economies in distinct stages of convergence is not beneficial for the least prepared, and can seriously compromise their growth and employment perspectives. Fiscal discipline and other integration requirements increase the social and economic costs of adjusting to specific disturbances and add to the difficulties in conquering and maintaining competitiveness.
Though Mundell (2002) defended that 'monetary stability is not everything, but, without it, the rest is nothing', African countries should not rush into monetary integration. If they do, they run the risk of sacrificing 'everything' for monetary stability.
